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Abstract. Inspired by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and its consequences on the global financial
system, we develop a simple model in which the Lehman default event is quantified as having an almost
immediate effect in worsening the credit worthiness of all financial institutions in the economic network.
In our stylized description, all properties of a given firm are captured by its effective credit rating, which
follows a simple dynamics of co-evolution with the credit ratings of the other firms in our economic network.
The dynamics resembles the evolution of Potts spin-glass with external global field corresponding to a panic
effect in the economy. The existence of a global phase transition, between paramagnetic and ferromagnetic
phases, explains the large susceptibility of the system to negative shocks. We show that bailing out the first
few defaulting firms does not solve the problem, but does have the effect of alleviating considerably the
global shock, as measured by the fraction of firms that are not defaulting as a consequence. This beneficial
effect is the counterpart of the large vulnerability of the system of coupled firms, which are both the direct
consequences of the collective self-organized endogenous behaviors of the credit ratings of the firms in our
economic network.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management
1 Introduction
The largest financial crisis since the great depression started
in 2007 with an initially well-defined epicenter focused on
mortgage backed securities (MBS). It has since been cas-
cading into a global economic recession, whose increasing
severity and uncertain duration has led and is continuing
to lead to massive losses and damage for billions of peo-
ple. This crisis has brought to the attention of everyone
the concept that risk can be endogenous and can cascade
as a growing avalanche through the financial and economic
system. This is the opposite of the assumption held previ-
ously by many regulators, credit agencies and bankers that
risks can be managed by using models essentially focusing
on the risk of each single institution, and by combining
them using assumptions of inter-dependencies calibrated
in good times. The unveiled systemic nature of financial
risks makes now clear the need for global approaches in-
cluding economic and financial networks and modeling the
collective behaviors that results from the coupling between
institutions, firms, financial products and so on.
a e-mail: psieczka@if.pw.edu.pl
b e-mail: dsornette@ethz.ch
c e-mail: jholyst@if.pw.edu.pl
During the development of the crisis in 2008, a succes-
sion of problems unfolded, the most prominent ones being
associated with names such as Bear Stearns, Fannie, Fred-
die, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia. Except for
the famous bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.,
all the other “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions and in-
surance companies were bailed out, while thousands of
smaller banks have been left alone to undergo bankruptcy.
We propose here a minimalist framework to account
for the observed cascade of defaults, which incorporates
the impact of changes of beliefs in credit worthiness of a
given firm, resulting from the change of credit worthiness
of other institutions in the same economic network. In this
way, we are able to account for the cascade phenomenon,
and explain how small changes can lead to dramatic con-
sequences, all the more so, the more coupled is the eco-
nomic network and the larger is the number of firms. Our
framework allows us to also analyze the so-called “Lehman
Brothers” effect, i.e., the crash on the stock market and
the subsequent panic among financial institutions, follow-
ing its filling for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. We
account for this aftermath by introducing a global field
influencing every firm by enlarging the probability of rat-
ing downgrade, which embodies the psychological impact
of the destruction of trust among institutions, which sud-
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denly realized that, after all, the US Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve might not bail them out. The abrupt drop in
confidence led to a drop in credit supply and to the major
recession. Finally, we investigate, within our set-up, the
effect of a simple bail-out policy consisting of accepting
to rescue a certain number of defaulting firms. We find
that this rescue policy is the most efficient when the econ-
omy is functioning at its most vulnerable state of critical
coupling between its constituting firms.
Many models have been proposed to investigate the
effects of credit contagion on the default probability of in-
dividual firms. Motivated by the accounting scandals at
Enron, Worldcom and Tyco, Giesecke [12] developed a
structural model of correlated multi-firm default, in which
investors update their belief on the liabilities of remaining
firms after each firm default, which leads to contagious
jumps in credit spreads of business partners. Eisenberg
and Noe created a model of contagion in a network of lia-
bilities [10]. When an agent cannot fulfill its obligation, it
defaults and the loss propagates along the network. Prop-
agation of this distress can trigger off another defaults by
contagion. Battiston et al. [5] studied a simple model of a
production network in which firms are linked by supply-
customer relationships involving extension of trade-credit.
They recover some stylized facts of industrial demography
and the correlation, over time and across firms, of output,
growth and bankruptcies. Delli Gatti et al. [8] studied the
properties of a credit-network economy characterized by
credit relationship connecting downstream and upstream
firm through trade credit and firms and banks through
bank credit. They included a change in the network topol-
ogy over time due to an endogenous process of partner
selection in an imperfect information decisional context,
which leads to an interplay between network evolution and
business fluctuations and bankruptcy propagation. The
bankruptcy of one entity can bring about the bankruptcy
of one or more other agents possibly leading to avalanches
of bankruptcies. Azizpour et al. [4] developed a self-excited
model of correlated event timing to estimate the price of
correlated corporate default risk. Sakata et al. [30] intro-
duced an infectious default and recovery model of a large
set of firms coupled through credit-debit contracts and
determined the default probability of k defaults. Ikeda et
al. [17] have developed an agent-based simulation of chain
bankruptcy, in which a decrease of revenue by the loss
of accounts payable is modeled by an interaction term,
and bankruptcy is defined as a capital deficit. Lorentz et
al. [23] have introduced a general framework for models
of cascade and contagion processes on networks using the
concept of the fragility of a firm, including the bundle
model, the voter model, and models of epidemic spread-
ing as special cases. Ormerod and Colbaugh [29] devel-
oped a model of heterogeneous agents interacting in an
network evolving according to the formation of alliances
based on the decisions of self-interested fitness optimiz-
ers. In the presence of external negative shocks, they find
that increasing the number of connections causes an in-
crease in the average fitness of agents, and at the same
time makes the system as whole more vulnerable to catas-
trophic failure/extinction events on an near-global scale.
Schafer et al. [31] set up a structural model of credit risk
for correlated portfolios containing many credit contracts
exposed to risk factors which undergo jump-diffusion pro-
cesses and derive the full loss distribution of the credit
portfolios. Neu and Ku¨hn [27] generalized existing struc-
tural models for credit risk in terms of credit contagion
with feedbacks, using the analogy to a lattice gas model
from physics. Already for moderate micro-economic de-
pendencies, they find that, for stronger mutually support-
ive relationship between the firms, collective phenomena
such as bursts and avalanches of defaults can be observed
in their model. Hatchett and Ku¨hn [16] studied the model
of [27] and found it to be solvable for the loss distributions
of large loan portfolios with fat tails. Anand and Ku¨hn [1]
extend these analyzes by studying the functional correla-
tion approach to operational risk and discover the coexis-
tence of operational and nonoperational phases, such that
their credit risk systems are susceptible to discontinuous
phase transitions from the operational to nonoperational
phase via catastrophic breakdown. Their model is also rel-
evant to understand the cascades of unprecedented losses
suffered in August 6, 2007, by a number of high-profile
and highly successful quantitative long/short equity hedge
funds [19].
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2
describes the model, with the definition of the key vari-
able, the “effective credit rating grade” (ECRG), its dy-
namics, and how we take into account the interdependen-
cies between firms through the changes of their ECRGs.
Section 3 presents the main results of how a global crisis
occurs in our model, and the relevance of a phase transi-
tion in the presence of the “panic” effect. Section 4 exam-
ines the sensitivity of the paths of defaulting economies
as a function of the average coupling strength between
firms, the panic field and the initial probabilities of ECRG
changes. Section 5 presents some results on the impact of
a simple rescue policy consisting in preventing the first
few defaults to occur. Section 6 concludes.
2 Description of the model
Our model is adapted from Sieczka and Ho lyst [38], who
introduced a stylized model of financial contagion among
interacting companies.
2.1 Definition of the key variable: “effective credit
rating grade” (ECRG) R
Since we wish to focus on the possible contagion and cas-
cade of defaults among the firms in a network, we abstract
from the multidimensional complexity of all the variables
impacting a firm’s financial health. We propose to capture
the solvability of a given firm i by a single variable Ri that
we refer to as the “effective credit rating grade” (ECRG).
In our simulations, we will consider a rather small number
of effective credit rating grades, that is, we assume that
the Ri’s take discrete values: 0, 1, ..., Rmax, with Rmax = 7.
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When Ri(t) = 7, investors (who are international to the
networked economy) consider agent i to be a safe invest-
ment. As the grade decreases, the risk perception of the
investors on agent i’s future profitability (and viability)
increases. In other words, investors are more skeptical of
agent i and hence less likely to lend to agent i in the fu-
ture. For Ri(t) = 0, agent i has defaulted on at least one
of its obligations to the lenders. This defaulted state is
assumed to be an absorbing state in that, once an agent
has defaulted in the economy, it remains so for the remain-
der of time. The effective credit rating grade Ri associated
with each firm provide an integrated, low dimensional and
effective indicator of the investors’ subjective perception
of the creditworthiness of firm i. We conjecture that the
effective credit rating grade Ri can be obtained as the end
result of a Mori-Zwanzig projection technique applied to a
full behavioral model, after integrating over all degrees of
freedom except these effective ratings degrees of freedom,
similarly to the approach of Neu and Kuhn on market
risks [21].
The term “effective credit rating grade” derives obvi-
ously from the standard credit rating which is provided
by credit rating agencies such as Fitch Ratings, Moody’s
Investors Service or Standard & Poor’s in the U.S. In-
deed, it is well-known that there is a strong correlation
between credit quality and default remoteness: the higher
the rating, the lower the probability of default, and the
lower ratings always correspond to higher default ratios
[6]. With default as our target, our model can also be
thought of as a description of the world of financial instru-
ments and their interactions. Thus, our model can also
be taken as a description of a network of various finan-
cial instruments, including collateral debt obligations and
structured asset-backed security, which formed the sub-
strate on which the 2007 crisis developed. Note that the
choice of the discrete values, 0, 1, ..., Rmax, with Rmax = 7,
for Ri is motivated by the principal grades (AAA, AA, A,
BBB, BB, B, CCC) used by rating agencies. We associate
deterministically the eighth lowest level R = 0 to the state
of default. This corresponds to a stylized representation of
the well-known abrupt increase of default rates as credit
rating deteriorates. For instance, for the period from 1981
to 1999, Standard & Poor’s reported a 0.00% probability
of default per year for AAA-rated firms, compared with a
value of 5.3% per year for B-rated firms and a value of 22%
for CCC-rated firms [6]. In the same vein, the probability
of a default over a 15 year period is 0.5% for AAA-rated
firms, compared with 30% for B-rated firms and of 48.3%
for CCC-rated firms.
Our aim is to account for the many complexities as-
sociated with the default hazard of each firm by focusing
on the dynamics of a single variable for each firm. Then,
the question arises as whether the dynamics of the stan-
dard credit ratings are faithful indicators of the evolution
of firm default hazards. The answer is probably negative,
in view of the wave of defaults that started in 2007 and
accelerated in 2008, in which many financial instruments,
special vehicles as well as major insurance companies and
investment banks that were rated AAA turned out to de-
fault.
This is the principal reason for our proposal to think
of each Ri, as not being the official published credit rating
grade but, as an “effective credit rating grade”, which can
be interpreted in several ways. It could be the real internal
credit worthiness, that credit agencies should strive to un-
cover. Another way to think about the effective credit rat-
ing grade is that it is the rating that the rating agency has
produced internally but not yet published due to their well
documented conflict of interest leading to patently mis-
leading published ratings. Indeed, it is now well-recognized
that the rating grade provided by rating agencies are im-
perfect, as shown by the development of the financial crisis
since 2007: (i) credit rating agencies do not downgrade
companies promptly enough; (ii) credit rating agencies
have made significant errors of judgment in rating struc-
tured products, particularly in assigning AAA ratings to
structured debt, which in a large number of cases has sub-
sequently been downgraded or defaulted. The “effective
credit rating grade” of a given firm can be also interpreted
as quantifying the risk perception of the market concern-
ing that firm.
2.2 Dynamical evolution of the Ri’s, for i = 1, ..., N in
a network of N firms
We consider a network of N firms operating in a common
economic environment. We assume that the dynamics of
the financial health of firms can be captured by that of
their effective credit rating grades (ECRG) Ri(t)’s. We
assume the simple discrete correlated random walk with
constraints,
Ri(t) = Ri(t− 1) + si(t), (1)
where si(t) is a stochastic variable taking only three pos-
sible values si(t) = −1, 0, 1.
This means that the ECRG of a given firm can change
by no more than one level over one time step, i.e., |Ri(t)−
Ri(t− 1)| ≤ 1.
Since a value of the ECRG of a firm equal to 7 corre-
sponds to the maximum possible level, if Ri(t − 1) = 7,
then Ri(t) can only either remain at the same level or
decrease by 1. This means that the one–time-step ECRG
change si(t) of a firm can only take values 0 or −1 if
Ri(t − 1) = 7. This corresponds to a “reflecting” condi-
tion of the discrete correlated random walk (1).
We assume that, when a firm or a financial product
defaults, it does not recover and remains at the default
state Ri = 0. This corresponds to si remaining equal to
0 for all subsequent time steps and this is an “absorbing”
condition for the discrete correlated random walk (1). Be-
cause we are describing a short time span of just a few
years in our simulations, we do not include a firm entry
process. Neglecting the creation of new banks seems to be
a reasonable assumption when thinking of the economy of
banks during the financial crisis.
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2.3 Interdependencies between firms in the changes of
their effective credit rating grades
There is rich literature on networks of firms, including
credit and corporate ownership networks, as well as pro-
duction, trade, supply chain and innovation networks (see
e.g. [33,34] and references therein). These links between
firms are concrete and quantifiable through cash flows or
control structures (such as voting rights). But, many of
these links, forming complex networks of creditor/obligor
relationships, revolving credit agreements and so on, are
largely unmapped [22]. This supports considering another
type of networks, a network of more intangible but nonethe-
less essential relationships of how the credit rating grades
of different firms interact. This idea is also suggested by
the cases of the Asian crises of 1997 and the more recent
subprime crisis of 2007-2008.
Consider first the case of the Asian crises in 1997 and
the remarkable fact emphasized by Krugman [20] that the
traditional measures of vulnerability did not forecast the
crisis. One possible explanation is that the problem was off
the government’s balance sheet, and not part of the gov-
ernments’ visible liabilities until after the fact. The crisis
developed as a self-fulfilling generated downward spiral of
asset deflation and disintermediation. Post-mortem anal-
yses have generally concluded that the key ingredient was
that many of the Asian countries at that time had either
pegged their currency to the dollar or operated in a nar-
row exchange rate band. In addition, asset price bubbles
were growing in these countries, catalyzed by an influx
of foreign funds. With deteriorating economic conditions,
these economies became ripe for speculative attacks and
bank runs. The sequence of events was one of speculative
attacks on the currency pegs in Thailand and Malaysia fol-
lowed by flight of capital away from these and surrounding
economies, a process sometimes referred to as twin-crisis
[15].
This all looks clear in hindsight, but the notion of
ripeness to speculative attacks and bank runs is a mat-
ter of debate. For instance, no bank, however sound its
capital and liability structure, can survive a bank run,
by construction. Krugman [20] emphasizes another impor-
tant effect, what we could call a “virtual” network effect:
while the real economic and financial links between the
strongest Asian tigers (South Korea and Hong-Kong) and
the others were weak on a relative GDP measure, foreign
investors lumped them in their mental framework as part
of the same “Asian” portfolio. Starting in Malaysia in July
1997, the contagion of the crisis to the other Asian coun-
tries was actually strongly amplified by the misperception
by foreign investors that these different economies (Thai-
land, Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong...) were strongly
linked. According to this mental framing [3], the problem
of Thailand was not just a one-country happenance due to
a localized over-indebtness, but it was thought that this
was the problem of the whole economic Asian zone. While
the vulnerability of South Korea and Hong Kong has been
disputed, the incorrect geographical emphasis made the
links become self-created by the western investors and
banks pulling out from all these countries simultaneously
in a process analogously to a bank run (see the argument
developed in some details in [20]).
The causes of the financial and economic crisis ini-
tiated by the subprime crisis starting in 2007 are mul-
tiple and intertwined. The following elements have been
documented and argued to be important contributors: (i)
Real-estate loans and MBS (morgage backed securities)
as fraction of bank assets, leading to feedback loops in
leverage and ultimately in fragility; (ii) Managers’ greed
and poor corporate governance problems; (iii) Deregula-
tion and lack of oversight; (iv) Bad quantitative risk mod-
els in banks (Basel II); (v) Lowering of lending standards;
(vi) Securitization of finance; (vii) Leverage; (viii) Rating
agency failures; (ix) Under-estimating aggregate risks; (x)
Growth of over-capacity; (xi) the agenda of several suc-
cessive US administration to promote accession to house
ownership to the middle-class and poor; (xii) Government
sponsored entities such as Freddy Mac and Fanny Mae
with unfair access to liquidity and mispriced returns due
to the implicit Government put option. There is an enor-
mous contemporary literature, which is growing everyday
and which analyzes these different factors and suggests
new solutions and new designs.
However, Sornette and Woodard argued recently [44]
that these elements were part of and contributed to a
more global process, dubbed “the illusion of the perpet-
ual money machine,” that developed over the last twenty
years. During its development, the shadow banking (with
a capital value peak of $2.2 trillions in early 2007) consti-
tuted a large network of inter-dependencies between finan-
cial instruments and between investment houses including
banks, that became apparent only after the crisis started
to unfold [20]. This shadow banking system included such
financial instruments as the auction rate preferred secu-
rities, asset-backed commercial paper, structured invest-
ment vehicles, tender option bonds and variable rate de-
mand notes. These different instruments are indeed inter-
acting directly through their overlapping collaterals and
underlying assets, and indirectly through their impacts
onto investment portfolios, through the joint impact of
economic and/or financial shocks and, very importantly
through the psychological contagion of investors.
These elements motivate us in modeling the direct as
well as indirect couplings between firms through the ef-
fective credit rating grade changes si’s. This provides us
with a coarse-grained description that has the advantage
of lumping together many coupled mechanisms. Following
the theory of multinomial choice [24,25], we formulate the
conditional probability for the ECRG change si(t) of a
given firm i under the form
P (si|s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sN , R1, ..., RN )
=
1
Z
exp

∑
j 6=i
Jijδsisj +H(R1, ..., RN )δsi−1

 , (2)
where δsisj is the Kronecker delta and Z ensures a proper
normalization. Here, the si on the left side of | is realized
at time t, while the conditioning variables on the right
side of | are realized at time t−1. Expression (2) gives the
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dependence of the probability that the ECRG change si(t)
of a firm i takes a value +1, 0 or −1, given the previous
ECRG changes sj(t−1), j 6= i at t−1, and given the ECRG
level R1(t−1), ..., RN (t−1) at time t−1. The probability
of a rating change does not depend on a rating history.
It is an assumption that agrees with a behavior of the
Merton model in which a value of a firm’s asset evolves
as a geometric Brownian motion and rating classes can be
translated into thresholds of the firm’s asset value.
This Ising-like expression (2) is also motivated by the
demonstration that finite-size long-range Ising model turns
out to be an adequate model for the description of homo-
geneous credit portfolios and the computation of credit
risk when default correlations between the borrowers are
included [26]. This probability (2) is controlled by two
contributions.
1. The term
∑
j 6=i Jijδsisj describes a mimetic or con-
tagion effect, as well as a persistence mechanism: the
larger the number of firms which have seen their grad-
ing updated upward (respectively unchanged or down-
ward), the more new firms will have their grading up-
dated upward (respectively unchanged or downward)
in the next time step.
The strength of the influence of firm i on firm j and
vice-versa (as we assume for simplicity symmetric cou-
plings) is quantified by the N ×N symmetric interac-
tion matrix {Jij}. The elements Jij can take zero, neg-
ative, or positive values. For Jij = 0, the two firms do
not influence each other through the contagion effect.
A positive Jij corresponds to two dependent firms in
the same industry branch, such that an improving (re-
spectively worsening) condition in one of them tends
to improve (respectively worsen) the situation of the
other firm. In contrast, a negative Jij may describe
anti-correlations, such that one firm might profit at the
expanse of the other one. As there is clear evidence of
a strong bias toward positive correlations among firms,
we assume that the Jij ’s are normally distributed with
a positive mean J0 and standard deviation σJ :
P (Jij) =
1√
2piσ2J
exp
(
−
(Jij − J0)
2
2σ2J
)
. (3)
2. The term H(R1, ..., RN )δsi,−1 embodies the sentiment
of panic, which was triggered when Lehman Broth-
ers Holding Inc., a global financial-services firm, de-
clared bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. The field
H(R1, ..., RN )δsi,−1 is equal to zero until the first ban-
kruptcy occurs in the network of firms, after which it
remains fixed to Hδsi,−1: after the first bankruptcy oc-
curs in our network, all credit rating grades are biased
towards deteriorating, where H is the strength of this
bias. Formally,
H(R1, ..., RN ) = H · (1−
∏
j
(1− δRj ,0)), (4)
which is equal to H when at least one firm defaulted
(Ri = 0), otherwise the field is equal to 0. The field
Hδsi,−1 models a global shock which appears after the
default of a first company. The “panic” field H cap-
tures the psychological impact of the destruction of
trust among institutions. Its structural impact is rea-
sonable in the interpretation of the “effective credit
rating grade” of a given firm as quantifying the risk
perception of the market concerning that firm. The
activation of H describes the contagion effect of the
increased risk perception. The activation of H can also
be justified as describing a genuine loss of real inter-
nal credit worthiness following a shock on one of the
firms, due to the inter-connected liabilities in the bank
balance sheets.
Finally, the panic term in equation (2) is either H (if
there is at least one bankrupted firm) or 0 (if there is
none). It could be argued to be more realistic to make
the panic term depending on the number of bankrupted
firms. Our simplifying framework consists in consider-
ing only the systemically important institutions such
as Bear Stearns, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, Washington
Mutual, Wachovia and so on, which are considered
consensually to be “too-big-to-fail” financial institu-
tions and insurance companies. Just one of them go-
ing to bankruptcy is arguably sufficient to trigger the
Lehman Brothers type of panics that we model here.
Our goal is to study what is the effect on the global
firm network of the change in psychological attitude of
investors following the first bankruptcy.
3 Global crisis as a phase transition in the
presence of the “panic effect”
3.1 Description of the numerical simulation procedure
We simulated a system of N = 1000 firms. The standard
deviation of the coupling coefficients Jij defined by (3)
is set to σJ = 0.001. We fix the average value J0 of the
coupling coefficients and the value H of the “panic field.”
1. We generate a given realization of a randomly initial-
ized matrix Jij ;
2. The initial sets of {si} and {Ri} are generated from
uniform distributions (with exclusion of R = 0);
3. A randomly selected spin si is updated according to
(2), followed by Ri which is updated according to (1);
4. We repeat the previous step N times in total, so as
to update the rating of N firms, which defines one
complete time step;
5. We then go back to steps 3 and 4 and iterate them 8
times, which corresponds to a total lifetime of 8 time
steps;
6. We count the number of defaults (ND) that have oc-
curred over these 8 time steps;
7. The whole procedure starting from step 1 to step 6
is repeated 1000 times to generate 1000 different re-
alizations over which we can average over the random
realizations of the matrix {Jij} and over the initial
values of {si} and {Ri}.
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In the following, we analyze different properties of the
systems of N firms as a function of J0 and H .
3.2 Critical point and susceptibility
3.2.1 Absence of the global “panic” field (H = 0)
In the absence of the panic field (H = 0), the dynamics
of the si’s defined by model (2) with the updating rules
described in subsection 3.1 is nothing but the implemen-
tation of the Glauber algorithm [13] applied to the Potts
model for a fully connected Potts model with random cou-
plings {Jij} with strictly positive average E[Jij ] := J0 > 0.
For such a system, it is known [35,11,28] that, in the limit
N → +∞, a phase transition separates a (so-called para-
magnetic) phase at J0 < J0c where the si’s on the aver-
age occupy all three states in equal numbers, from a (so-
called ferromagnetic) phase at J0 > J0c where one state
of the si’s dominates over the remaining two. If we define
p and q as the relative numbers of si’s in states −1 and
1 respectively, we can describe the system using the pair
(p, q). The system in the paramagnetic phase is character-
ized by (1/3, 1/3). In case of a ferromagnetic phase, three
equi-probable pairs (pi(J0, σJ ), qi(J0, σJ )) with pi 6= 1/3,
qi 6= 1/3 are possible and the system selects one of them
randomly according to the influence of initial conditions
and its noisy dynamics. This is the phenomenon of “spon-
taneous symmetry breaking”, defined as the situation in
which the solution selected by the dynamics has a lower
symmetry than its equation. The concept of spontaneous
symmetry breaking has many important applications in
many fields of science [2,7,9,14,36,37,45], with deep im-
plications that span the creation of the universe, the fun-
damental interactions in physics, the emergence of parti-
cle masses to the emergence of stock market speculation
[39]. When the average coupling strength J0 is equal to
the critical value J0c, the system is at its critical point at
which its susceptibility diverges for N →∞ (and grows as
a positive power of N for finite N). The numerical value
of J0c in the limit N → +∞ is a well-defined function of
σJ [28].
For H = 0, we thus expect each ECRG Ri to follow a
kind of correlated unbiased random walk for J0 < J0c. In
contrast, for J0 > J0c, the spontaneous symmetry break-
ing of the average of the si’s translates into a non-zero
bias. With probability 1/3, this bias is positive, tending
to push the credit ratings upwards. With probability 1/3,
the bias is negative, pushing the firms inexorably towards
the default state R = 0. And with probability 1/3, the bias
is neutral, keeping the credit rating in its position. Figure
1 presents the average cumulative number of defaults ob-
served in our simulations over 8 time steps, averaged over
1000 realizations, as a function of J0 for different field
amplitudes H . For H = 0, we observe that the fraction of
firms that have defaulted in the time span of 8 time steps
jumps from ≃ 0.2 to ≃ 0.3 as J0 passes through a critical
value J0c ≈ 0.0045. This is the signature of the bias just
mentioned above associated with the spontaneous symme-
try breaking occurring above the critical point at J0c.
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Fig. 1. Relative number of defaults (ND/N) as a function of
J0 for different values of the “panic” field amplitude H .
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Fig. 2. Susceptibility χ(J0) defined by (5) for N = 1000 with
errorbars corresponding to a standard deviation.
3.2.2 Effect of the global “panic” field (H > 0)
For H > 0, the number of defaults ND develops a maxi-
mum for J0 in the vicinity of the critical point J0c and the
value of the maximum is higher for higher values of the
panic field H . This peak is due to the phenomenon men-
tioned above that the neighborhood of the critical point
is associated with an increased susceptibility of the sys-
tem to external perturbations. In the present context, the
susceptibility (or we should rather say the vulnerability to
panic) can be defined as
χ =
∂ND
∂H
∣∣∣
H=0
. (5)
A numerical estimation of the susceptibility for the system
of N = 1000 nodes and different J0 is presented in Fig. 2.
A maximum of χ near the critical point is clearly visible.
The peak is expected to diverge as the system size N goes
to infinity.
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Fig. 3. Dependence of ND scaled by the system size N versus
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Fig. 4. Same as Figure 3 for H = 0.08.
3.2.3 Critical susceptibility and non-monotonous nonlinear
amplification of negative shocks
The interplay between the panic field H and the collective
phenomenon of defaults is well illustrated by comparing
Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 for H = 0 shows that the
number of defaults scaled by the size N of the economy
is independent of N . In other words, for all values of the
average coupling strength J0, the number of defaults is
simply proportional to the size of the economy all along
the nonlinear path as a function of J0. This result illus-
trates that the severity of the crisis which, in an economy
where firms are coupled to each other, does not remain
localized to a few firms but scales with the size of the
economy.
Figure 4 shows that, in the presence of the panic field
H , the simple scaling of Figure 3 does not hold anymore. It
is replaced by a strong nonlinear amplification of the num-
ber of defaults with the size of the economy: the scaled
variable ND/N grows with growing N at the peak oc-
curring close at the critical point J0c. Far away from the
critical point, one can observe again a good collapse of
the curves for different economy sizes. Thus, the nonlinear
amplification as a function of system size N is specifically
associated with the behavior of the susceptibility which
tends to diverge at J0c as the system size N increases.
Figures 1-4 carry two vivid messages.
– Even in the absence of panic (H = 0), as the strength
of the interactions between firms increases, represented
by a rising J0, the severity of the crisis quantified by
the fraction of firms defaulting on their obligations ex-
hibits an abrupt nonlinear jump around a critical value
J0c.
– In the presence of the panic field (H > 0), the sit-
uation worsens considerably, with nonlinear and non-
monotonous responses as a function of the average cou-
pling strength J0. The observed maximum susceptibil-
ity to a panic effect is associated with a very strong
dependence on the size of the system: as shown in Fig-
ure 4, the larger the number of interacting firms and
of coupled financial instruments in the economy, the
much larger is the amplitude of the crisis as measured
by the fraction of default.
Students of collective phenomena will not be surprised
by these strong nonlinearities that emerge endogenously
from the interactions between the N firms and might even
take advantage of the existence of precursors associated
with the approach to the critical point (see chapter 10
on “Transitions, bifurcations and precursors” of [41]). In
other words, while the severity of the crisis is many times
amplified in the presence of a panic field in a neighborhood
of the critical point, making them akin to so-called pre-
dictable “dragon-king” [42], the good news is that such be-
havior can be anticipated [40,32]. The analysis presented
by Sornette and Woodard [44] supports this claim, based
on the realization that the fundamental cause of the un-
folding financial and economic crisis stems from the ac-
cumulation of five bubbles and their interplay and mu-
tual reinforcement. In this vein, one of us and his group
at ETH Zurich has started the “financial bubble experi-
ment” to test systematically and rigorously the hypothesis
that financial crises can be diagnosed in advance [43]. The
present model provides a possible supporting mechanism.
4 Sensitivity study of the paths of defaulting
economies
The evolution of firms depends on the initial condition of
the economy, represented by the set of {si} and {Ri} val-
ues at the initial time. In the simulations whose results
have been presented in Figures 1-4, we used initial condi-
tions for which the 3 states s and the 7 non-zero rating
level R are equally populated. Defining p(t) and q(t) as
the probabilities for s = −1 and s = 1 respectively at
time t, this corresponds to p(0) = q(0) = 1/3.
We now study how the evolution of the economy de-
pends on different initial conditions for p(0) and q(0).
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4.1 Evolution of the ECRG changes by homogenized
equations
First, we study the evolution of the ECRG change si(t)
via their probabilities. The evolution of the probability
of the different states {si}, in absence of default, can be
described by the following equations [38]
p(t+ 1) =
exp(J˜0p(t) +H)
exp(J˜0p(t) +H) + exp(J˜0q(t)) + exp(J˜0(1− p(t)− q(t)))
,
(6)
q(t+ 1) =
exp(J˜0q(t))
exp(J˜0p(t) +H) + exp(J˜0q(t)) + exp(J˜0(1− p(t)− q(t)))
,
(7)
where J˜0 = J0N . Of course, the probability that the
ECRG change is 0 at time t is simply 1−p(t)−q(t). These
equations (6-7) are obtained by using a representative firm
approach, known in mathematics as an homogenization
procedure, and in physics as a mean-field approximation.
Starting with an initial condition (p(0), q(0)), the equa-
tions (6-7) were iterated to obtain an asymptotic value
p(∞) at long times. The results are presented in Fig. 5.
The initial state (p(0), q(0)) is represented by a point on
a x, y plane, while the final state p(∞) is visualized by a
specific color. It can be seen that the effect of initial initial
conditions is different for different parameters J0 and H .
In a paramagnetic phase (J˜0 = 0.1, H = 0.5), all ini-
tial conditions lead to the same final state, which is biased
by the field H . A ferromagnetic phase (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 0.1)
breaks into two final states of a complete ordering which
depends on the initial condition. In the illustrated case,
the symmetry is broken by the field and, as a consequence,
the state p(∞) ≃ 0.93 is favored. In the ferromagnetic
phase with a strong field (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 1.0), the symme-
try is completely broken and all initial conditions lead to
p(∞) ≃ 0.98. For higher interaction strength (J˜0 = 5.0,
H = 1.0), the system is back to a two-state competition
with p(∞) ≃ 1 state preferred more often, due to the ef-
fect of the field. In the cases (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 0.1) and
(J˜0 = 5.0, H = 1.0), the bottom dark regions correspond
to states ordered along the neutral axis with zero average
magnetization. This rating status quo could result from
economic stagnation with no firm default but no improve-
ment in credit ratings.
A mean field approach for an infinite range model pro-
vides the exact solution. However, applying a mean field
approach to our model constitutes an approximation for
two reasons. First, we assume in equations (6-7) that the
field H is nonzero from the beginning of the iteration which
is not true in the simulations where the field appears after
the first default happens. Second, the simulations run over
a finite time, so that the asymptotic state p(∞) can only
be an approximation. Results of the iteration presented in
Fig. 5 play an illustrative role and show areas of initial
conditions that lead to common asymptotic solution.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the cumulative number ND(t) of de-
faults as a function of time for 8 time steps of simulations for
J0 = 0.0005, σJ = 0.001, corresponding to the “paramagnetic”
phase in which the average ECRG changes is zero. One can
observe that different initial conditions lead to similar evolu-
tions. The curves are obtained by averaging over 1000 different
realizations with the same parameters.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
N
D
/N
t
p=0.1 q=0.8
p=0.3 q=0.4
p=0.4 q=0.3
p=0.8 q=0.1
Fig. 7. Same as Figure 6 for J0 = 0.005, σJ = 0.001 cor-
responding to the “ferromagnetic” phase in which collective
effects are enhanced.
4.2 Sensitivity of defaults on initial conditions
Is the development of a financial crisis through a cascade
of default ineluctable? What is the role of the initial con-
ditions and of random shocks during its development? We
can address these questions by using our model and study
the impact of different values p(0), q(0) of the probabili-
ties of the initial ECRG changes −1 and +1 for various
J0 and H .
In the paramagnetic phase (J0 < J0c), the initial val-
ues p(0), q(0) have only a small effect on the number of
defaults and a small difference between them leads to
negligible consequences as shown in Figure 6. This figure
presents the evolution of ND(t) for four different starting
points (p(0), q(0)) in the paramagnetic phase with zero
panic field (H = 0). In both cases, the number of defaults
grows linearly in time with similar rate.
In contrast, for J0 ≥ J0c corresponding to the fer-
romagnetic phase with H = 0, initial conditions play
a strong role in determining the subsequence evolution.
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Fig. 5. Color coding of the long-time probability p(∞) for the ECRG change of a firm in absence of default to take the value
s = −1. The initial state (p(0), q(0)) is represented by a point on a x, y plane, while the final state p(∞) is visualized by a
specific color, whose value is read from the code-bar on the right of the panels. Upper left panel: a biased paramagnetic phase
(J˜0 = 0.1, H = 0.5); upper right panel: a ferromagnetic phase with slightly broken symmetry (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 0.1); lower left
panel: a ferromagnetic phase with completely broken symmetry (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 1.0); lower right panel: a ferromagnetic phase
with broken symmetry (J˜0 = 5.0 H = 1.0).
Fig. 7 illustrates the typical situation in which two very
different scenarios develop for the cumulative number of
defaults for systems starting with different initial condi-
tions. The upper curves in Fig. 7 favors s = −1. This
slight breaking of symmetry in the initial probability con-
dition is sufficient to accelerate tremendously the rate of
default, compared to the situation shown in Figure 6. In
the case p(0) = 0.3, q(0) = 0.4 corresponding to a small
bias towards the ECRG change s = +1, the cooperative
ferromagnetic phase has the effect of actually quenching
the crisis, i.e., making it less severe with a rapid saturation
to a total number of defaults more than half that obtained
for the same initial conditions in the paramagnetic phase
shown in Figure 6.
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate further the drastically in-
creased sensitivity to different initial conditions, as the
average coupling strength J0 crosses the critical region
J ≃ J0c, in the presence of a non-zero panic field H .
As shown in these Figures, different starting points may
lead to opposite default scenarios, seen as a pair of two
branches. As the panic field increases to rather large val-
ues, an interesting effect is visualized in Fig. 9: in the ab-
sence of bias in the initial conditions (p(0) = q(0) = 0.1),
the number of defaults is maximum close to the critical
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Fig. 8. Cumulative number ND of defaults as a function of
the average coupling strength J0 for pairs of different initial
conditions (p = 0.1, q = 0.1) and (p = 0.6, q = 0.1) and two
values of the panic field indicated in the figure (H = 0.04 and
H = 0.3).
point J0c while going to zero for large J0’s. In contrast,
when a bias is present (p(0) = 0.6, q(0) = 0.1) in favor
of s = −1, the number of defaults increases rapidly to an
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Fig. 9. Same as Figure 8 except for the two values of the panic
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Fig. 10. Time evolution of an ensemble of 100 realizations
of an economy with the same parameters J0 = 0.006 with
symmetric initial conditions p(0) = q(0) = 1/3.
almost complete collapse of the economy as the coupling
strength increases.
4.3 Direct impact of the phenomenon of “spontaneous
symmetry breaking”
These effects described in the previous subsection are in
essence all the children of the “spontaneous symmetry
breaking” occurring for J0 > J0c mentioned in subsec-
tion 3.2.1, amplified by two additional symmetry break-
ing in the initial conditions and in the presence of the
panic field. To make the point clearer, Figure 10 shows
the time evolution of an ensemble of 100 realizations of
an economy with the same parameters J0 = 0.006, with
symmetric initial conditions p(0) = q(0) = 1/3. We can
observe that about 40% of the economies bifurcate to a
large number of defaults while the other 60% exhibit a
much milder crisis. Nothing but the phenomenon of spon-
taneous symmetry breaking differentiates these different
realizations. The conclusion is that, for systems function-
ing close to and above a critical point, a large variability
can be observed with, under the same conditions, either
a very severe or a very mild crisis unfolding. The later
would not doubt be hailed as the success of better regula-
tions or better policy or risk management, while this huge
difference is inherent to the dynamics of systems driven
by collective effects.
The pattern of time evolutions shown in figure 10 can
be interpreted from the diagrams of figure 5, specifically
the cases (J˜0 = 3.5, H = 0.1) and (J˜0 = 5.0, H = 1.0) in
which the dark regions correspond to states ordered along
the positive or the neutral axis. In such regimes, the num-
ber of up-going trajectories leading to a large occurrence
of firm defaults is about 40% of all trajectories. This 40%
fraction consists of a fraction of 33% of trajectories asso-
ciated with the negative ordered phase and of a number
of trajectories that run first in the paramagnetic phase
until they become ordered in the neutral phase. Since the
paramagnetic phase allows stochastic movements of firm
rating to R = 0, a number of firms are subjected to this
effect.
5 Impact of rescue policy
Until now, our model has implemented the negative psy-
chological effect of defaults occurring in the economy via
a “panic” field, which tends to enhance the downgrading
of firms and the probability of default. We have shown
that the negative sentiment, modeled by the panic field
H which appears when the first default happens, has the
effect of destabilizing the economy and of increasing signif-
icantly the number of defaults. As discussed in the intro-
duction, the inspiration of our model and subsequent anal-
ysis was the occurrence of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
and the controversial decision by the US Treasury and the
Federal Reserve to let Lehman Brothers fail. Our model
provides a simple playground to test what would be the
effect of a policy bailing out defaulting firms in the hope
of regaining stability.
We thus implemented a rescue policy in our simula-
tions by resetting the first B firms that default when their
rating reach R = 0 with an effective credit rating grade
(ECRG) R randomly chosen between 1 and 7 and with
ECRG changes s randomly set between −1, 0 and +1 with
the same probabilities. Because the rescue occurs before
the information that R = 0 can spread within the net-
work, it corresponds to a bail-out action just before an
agent defaults.
Fig. 11 shows that the bailing out policy can signifi-
cantly reduce the scale of collective bankruptcies, however
it cannot prevent them. Again, the impact of the rescue
policy is strongest close to the critical point where is the
economy is the most susceptible to shocks, either negative
or positive. The impact of the rescue policy is quantified
in Figures 12 and 13, which presents the dependence as
a function of J0 of the fraction ∆ND/N = (ND(B =
0)−ND(B))/N of firms that avoid bankruptcy as a con-
sequence of the policy to bail out the firstB first defaulting
firms. For a fixed moderate panic fieldH = 0.08, Figure 13
shows that just bailing out one firm reduces by about 2%
the relative number of defaulting firms. While seemingly
not much, for our economy of 1000 firms, this amounts to
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Fig. 11. Cumulative number ND(J0) of defaults as a function
of the average coupling strength J0, for H = 0.08 and different
rescue parameter B.
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Fig. 13. Same as Figure 12 for a fixed rescue parameter B = 5
and three different panic fields.
save endogenously about 20 firms by the spill-over effect
of the collective interactions in the network of firms at the
cost of just bailing out one firm. Bailing out the first 10
defaulting firms lead to a maximum salvation of 16% of
the firms in the economy (or 160 out of the 1000). While
the (gain / cost) ratio = 16%/10) for B = 10 is smaller
than the (gain / cost) ratio = 2%/1) for B = 1, the effect
remains significant.
Figure 13 shows that the impact of the rescue policy
is stronger for larger panic fields, as would be hoped for.
6 Conclusions
Johnson [18] summarizes the three main events that trig-
gered the severe global phase of the crisis as follows: “On
the weekend of September 13-14, 2008, the U.S. govern-
ment declined to bailout Lehman. The firm subsequently
failed, i.e., did not open for business on Monday, Septem-
ber 15. Creditors suffered major losses, and these had
a particularly negative effect on the markets given that
through the end of the previous week the Federal Reserve
had been encouraging people to continue to do business
with Lehman... On Tuesday, September 16, the govern-
ment agreed to provide an emergency loan to the major
insurance company, AIG. This loan was structured so as to
become the company’s most senior debt and, in this fash-
ion, implied losses for AIG’s previously senior creditors;
the value of their investments in this AAA bastion of cap-
italism dropped 40% overnight... By Wednesday, Septem-
ber 17, it was clear that the world’s financial markets - not
just the US markets, but particularly US money market
funds - were in cardiac arrest. The Secretary of the Trea-
sury immediately approached Congress for an emergency
budgetary appropriation of $700bn (about 5% of GDP),
to be used to buy up distressed assets and thus relieve
pressure on the financial system...”
Inspired by these events, we have developed a sim-
ple model of the “Lehman Brothers effect” in which the
Lehman default event is quantified as having an almost
immediate effect in worsening the credit worthiness of all
financial institutions in the economic network. This ef-
fect embodies (i) the direct consequences of the Lehman
default on its creditors as well as (ii) the psychological im-
pact of the realization that the US Treasury and Federal
Reserve was ready to let fail a major financial institution
so that no one felt protected anymore and (iii) the valua-
tion effect that the worthiness of financial derivatives was
much less than previously estimated, leading to a global
realization that the problem was much more severe that
imagined before. We have offered a stylized description in
which all properties of a given firm can be captured by its
effective credit rating. We have specified simple dynamics
of co-evolution of the effective credit ratings of coupled
firms, that show the existence of a global phase transition
around which the susceptibility of the system is strongly
enhanced. In this context, we show that bailing out the
first few defaulting firms does not solve the problem, but
does alleviate considerably the global shock, as measured
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by the fraction of firms that are not defaulting as a con-
sequence. We quantify a more than ten-fold effect: bailing
out the first (respectively the first ten) defaulting firm(s)
saves 20 (respectively 160) more firms in an economy of
1000 firms. This amplification effect is the direct conse-
quence of the collective linkage between the firm credit
ratings in our economic network which is organized en-
dogenously.
An idea to generalize the model would be to introduce
heterogeneity in size of the firms and in their economic
connections in order to make them more realistic. That
could be done by introducing a different, non symmetric
interaction matrix Jij in which one node would have a
greater impact on its partners than the opposite. We leave
this issue for a further studies.
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